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The purpose of this paper is to show how probabilistic argumentation is applicable to mod-
ern public-key cryptography as an appropriate tool to evaluate webs of trust. This is an inter-
esting application of uncertain reasoning that has not yet received much attention in the
corresponding literature.
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In large open networks like the internet an increasing demand for security is ob-
served. In order to establish a conﬁdential channel between two users of the network,
classical single-key cryptography requires them to exchange a common secret key
over a secure channel. This may work if the network is small and local, but it is infea-
sible in non-local or large networks. To simplify the key exchange problem, modern
public-key cryptography provides a mechanism in which the keys to be exchanged
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They are used to encrypt messages to be sent to the owner of the key or to verify
digital signatures issued by the owner of the key.
Before using someone elses public key to encrypt a message or verify a signature,
one should make sure that the key really belongs to the intended recipient or the
indicated issuer of the signature. Achieving authenticity of public keys can be done
in several ways. The most popular approach is based on the concept of digital cer-
tiﬁcates. The idea is that diﬀerent users or entities of a network certify public keys
of other network users. This leads to a certiﬁcate graph. Of course, certiﬁcates should
only be issued if the keys authenticity is veriﬁed. On the basis of a certiﬁcate graph,
one can then evaluate the authenticity of the keys on the basis of how much trust one
assigns to the diﬀerent issuers of the certiﬁcates. Because such an evaluation depends
on trust, it is common to call such a certiﬁcate graph web of trust. Section 2 gives a
short introduction to public-key cryptography and webs of trust. For more informa-
tion we refer to the literature [14,23].
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is a popular and widely used implementation of pub-
lic-key cryptography for email security [28]. It organizes public keys on the basis of a
web of trust [22]. PGPs way of evaluating the web of trust is a simple mechanism
based on three pragmatic rules. Some authors have tried to formalize the concepts
of trust and conﬁdence more properly [1–3,17,24,25], but approaches to look at
the problem from the perspective of the uncertain reasoning or AI community are
rare. One exception is the idea of applying Dempster–Shafer theory in the context
of a distributed reputation management [26]. Another exception is Maurers ap-
proach [13] on the basis of probabilistic logic [6,15]. An analysis and overview of dif-
ferent authentiﬁcation metrics is given in [18].
Among the various formalisms for uncertain reasoning, probabilistic argumenta-
tion [10] seems to be one of the most promising candidates. Ordinary Bayesian net-
works, for example, fail as a possible candidate because they require the underlying
graphs to be acyclic [16] (whereas general certiﬁcate graphs are cyclic). The basic
concepts of probabilistic argumentation are summarized in Section 3. As Section 4
demonstrates, by modeling trust as the probability of somebodys reliability, trans-
lating a web of trust into a corresponding probabilistic argumentation system is
straightforward. And it leads to a one-to-one correspondence between the concepts
of certiﬁcate chains and arguments. We will present an eﬃcient algorithm to com-
pute such arguments. Degree of support, which is the probability that at least one
argument holds, or the probability of provability that the authenticity of a key is log-
ically inferable from the given web of trust, can then be used to measure quantita-
tively the overall reliability of all possible certiﬁcate chains and thereby to rate the
validity of the corresponding public key.
The approach we propose in this paper is in many ways analogue to Maurers
trust model described in [13], but in addition we will present a concise algorithm
and show how to properly include key revocations. We also think that the frame-
work of probabilistic argumentation, in comparison with probabilistic logic, is a
more intuitive approach to uncertain reasoning and, in terms of available computa-
tional techniques, more advanced.
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ment, the goal of this paper is twofold. First, it is supposed to increase the awareness
of people interested in reasoning under uncertainty for this interesting application in
public-key cryptography. Second, the paper intends to demonstrate how to use prob-
abilistic argumentation in real world applications and to underline the value of this
elegant formalism.2. Public-key cryptography and the web of trust
Modern cryptography consists of two major tasks: encryption and signing. To
transmit a message m securely from sender A to recipient B, both sender and recip-
ient have to be equipped with a corresponding pair of public and private keys. Private
keys are kept secret, whereas public keys are widely available for any recipient. From
As perspective, sending m over an insecure channel (e.g. the internet) to recipient B
requires A to encrypt the message with Bs public key and to digitally sign it with As
own private key. On the side of recipient B, the message is decrypted with Bs private
key and the digital signature is veriﬁed with As public key. Provided that A and B
have properly exchanged their public keys, this simple scheme realizes the main secu-
rity goals (secrecy, message integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation) for such a two-
party communication (see Fig. 1).
Public keys are usually distributed with the aid of key servers. Before sending en-
crypted messages to recipients B, A may copy Bs public key from a key server. On
the other side, B may copy As public key from a key server in order to verify As
digital signatures. The question is whether the keys copied from the key servers
are really owned by B and A, respectively. A possible attacker or opponent O could
easily generate key pairs and post the corresponding public keys in As or Bs name
onto the server. Encrypting a message falsely to Os public key enables O to decrypt
and read the message (and at the same time disables B to decrypt the message). Sim-
ilarly, verifying a digital signature with false public key enables the attacker O to sign
messages in the name of A. An important issue is thus the veriﬁcation of public keys
before using them. One way to verify a public key is to compare its nearly unique
ﬁngerprint (a hash code of ﬁxed length) over a secure channel (e.g. the telephone
line). This method may work in small or local networks with few users, but is imprac-
tical in large networks like the internet.insecure
channel
Encrypt
Sign
Decrypt
Verify
Message m Message m
A's private key
B's public key
A's public key
B's private key
Sender A Recipient B
Fig. 1. Encrypted and signed two-party communication over an insecure channel.
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certiﬁcates. A digital certiﬁcate can be seen as a digitally signed public key. For
example, to issue a certiﬁcate for A, the issuer C digitally signs As public key with
Cs own private key. By doing this, C certiﬁes that A is the true owner of the key.
Of course, certiﬁcates should only be issued when the public key was either obtained
or successfully veriﬁed over a secure channel. Note that a digital certiﬁcate may con-
sist of signatures from diﬀerent issuers.
If A receives Bs certiﬁcate issued by C, then A has good reasons to accept the cor-
responding public key as Bs true public key, whenever the following three conditions
are satisﬁed:
(1) A fully trusts C to always carefully verify public keys before issuing certiﬁcates,
(2) A has received or veriﬁed Cs public key over a secure channel,
(3) A has successfully veriﬁed the certiﬁcate using Cs public key.A collection of dig-
ital certiﬁcates is called public-key infrastructure (PKI). In practice, there are two
approaches to build PKIs.2.1. Certiﬁcate authorities
The ﬁrst approach requires the certiﬁcates to be issued by trustworthy certiﬁcate
authorities (CA). For example, if C is a trustworthy CA (i.e. before issuing a certif-
icate, C carefully checks if the applicant is the true owner of the public key), then the
users of a large network may exchange their public keys by exchanging respective
certiﬁcates issued by C. Certiﬁcates issued by C can be veriﬁed using Cs public
key. From the successful veriﬁcation follows then the authenticity of the correspond-
ing public key.
If more than one CA issues certiﬁcates, it is possible that the diﬀerent CAs mutu-
ally issue certiﬁcates to each other. This leads to certiﬁcate trees which are usually
organized hierarchically. Fig. 2 shows such a tree in which network users are repre-
sented by circles and CAs by squares. An arrow from entity X to entity Y (users or
CAs) represents Xs certiﬁcate issued by Y. The formal notation for such a certiﬁcate
will be X) Y.
If A has an authentic copy of Aut1s public key, then the authenticity of Ms cer-
tiﬁcate M) Aut3 can be veriﬁed using Aut3s certiﬁcate Aut3) Aut2 and Aut2s cer-Fig. 2. Example of an undirected certiﬁcate tree with certiﬁcate authorities.
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quires A to fully and unconditionally trust all CAs along the path between M and
A. If any CA in the path has incorrectly issued the certiﬁcate of the next CA, then
A can be misled regarding the authenticity ofMs certiﬁcate. Note that there is a un-
ique certiﬁcate chain between any two users attached to such a certiﬁcate tree.
The major advantage of a centralized PKI is that every user is required to employ
only one secure channel in order to get an authentic copy of its own CAs public key.
The major disadvantage is the requirement of unconditional trust in all CAs
involved.
2.2. Web of trust
The second approach does not require certiﬁcate authorities. The idea is that
every user in the network can issue certiﬁcates. This leads to certiﬁcate graphs rather
than trees. In such a decentralized context, one usually speaks about signing public
keys rather than issuing certiﬁcates. Thus, every user collects signed public keys from
diﬀerent keys servers or other sources. A personal collection of signed public keys is
called key ring. Note that every individual key ring deﬁnes a corresponding certiﬁcate
graph (which is a sub-graph of the complete certiﬁcate graph of all signed public
keys).
Fig. 3 shows the certiﬁcate graph that corresponds to As key ring. An arrow from
user X to user Y means that Y has signed Xs public key. Question marks represent
users whose public keys are unknown to A. In the example shown in Fig. 3, A has
directly signed the public keys of B, C, D, E, and F. This means that A has received
or veriﬁed these keys over a secure channel and accepts them as the authentic keys of
B, C, D, E, and F, respectively. In other words, the public keys of B, C, D, E, and F
are valid for A. Many other keys in the graph are signed by users diﬀerent from A.
User G, for example, has signed the keys of L and M. From As perspective, G is
called introducer of Ls and Ms certiﬁcate.Fig. 3. Example of a decentralized certiﬁcate graph.
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dence in all introducers along the path of at least one certiﬁcate chain. This means
that A must consider the corresponding introducers to be fully trustworthy in the
sense that they only issue certiﬁcates for public keys received or veriﬁed over secure
channels. In the certiﬁcate graph depicted in Fig. 3, there is only one certiﬁcate chain
L) G) B) A from L to A. Thus, in order to validate Ls public key, A has to
trust both G and B. On the other hand, there are two certiﬁcate chains
M) G) B) A and M) H) C) A from M to A. In order to validate Ms
public key, A must trust either G and B or H and C.
A certiﬁcate graph in which the validity of the public keys is evaluated on the basis
of trust is called web of trust. Note that hierarchical certiﬁcate trees with fully trust-
worthy CAs are particular webs of trust in which all introducers receive maximal
trust.
A general web of trust allows the owner of the key ring to specify gradual levels of
trust for all individuals involved in the web. Completely trustworthy and untrustwor-
thy are the two extreme cases of maximal and minimal trust, respectively. Evaluating
the validity of the public keys should then lead to gradual levels of validity. Full
validity, for example, only results from full trust along the path of at least one cer-
tiﬁcate chain (such as in the hierarchical case with CAs). The evaluation of such a
general web of trust on the basis of probabilistic argumentation systems is the con-
tribution of this paper.
2.3. PGP’s web of trust
PGP is one of the most popular tools for public-key cryptography. The software
can be used to encrypt and digitally sign electronic mail. It is based on a web of trust
with some particular characteristics. First of all, PGP allows (only) three levels of
trust: completely trustworthy, marginally trustworthy, and untrustworthy. Note that
the owner of the key ring automatically receives full trust. In order to rate a public
key as ‘‘valid’’, PGP either requires
(a) the key to belong to the owner of the key ring,
(b) a signature from at least one 1 completely trustworthy introducer with a ‘‘valid’’
public key,
(c) signatures from at least two 2 marginally trustworthy introducers with ‘‘valid’’
public keys.
Otherwise, the key is rated as ‘‘invalid’’. 3 Note that all public keys directly signed by
the owner of the key ring are ‘‘valid’’. An example to illustrate PGPs trust model is1 One is the default value, but a diﬀerent (higher) value may be chosen by the user.
2 Two is the default value, but a diﬀerent (higher) value may be chosen by the user.
3 PGP also deﬁnes ‘‘marginally valid’’ public keys, but they are considered as ‘‘invalid’’ by default.
Fig. 4. Example of a PGPs web of trust.
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marginally trustworthy, and white circles for untrustworthy introducers. ‘‘Valid’’
public keys are indicated by nested circles.
As public key is ‘‘valid’’ because it is owned by A. The public keys of B, C, D, E,
and F are all ‘‘valid’’ because they are directly signed by A. H and I are ‘‘valid’’ be-
cause C is ‘‘valid’’ and completely trustworthy. J is ‘‘valid’’ because E is ‘‘valid’’ and
completely trustworthy. K is ‘‘valid’’ because J is ‘‘valid’’ and completely trustwor-
thy. N is ‘‘valid’’ because both H and I are ‘‘valid’’ and marginally trustworthy. Fi-
nally, P is ‘‘valid’’ because J is ‘‘valid’’ and completely trustworthy. All other keys
are ‘‘invalid’’.
The PGP trust model is unsatisfactory in many ways. First of all, although trust is
a gradual quantity that reﬂects someones conﬁdence in someone elses reliability,
PGP provides only three levels of trust. Similarly, by simply distinguishing between
‘‘valid’’ and ‘‘invalid’’ public keys, PGP is not able to gradually rate the authenticity
of the keys. Another problem is the rule that keys signed by at least two marginallyFig. 5. More examples of PGPs web of trust.
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a pragmatic way of evaluating webs of trust, but it is certainly not the result of a
proper and well-founded trust model. In fact, one can easily construct counter-
intuitive examples such as the ones shown in Fig. 5.
On the left-hand side of Fig. 5, PGPs trust model rates Bs public key as ‘‘valid’’,
whereas on the right-hand side, it is rated as ‘‘invalid’’. However, because there is
any desired number of possible certiﬁcate chains in the web of trust on the right-
hand side, each chain including one marginally trustworthy and one completely
trustworthy introducer, one would expect to rate the validity of Bs key with a much
higher degree than in the web of trust shown on the left-hand side with only two pos-
sible certiﬁcate chains.3. Probabilistic argumentation
Probabilistic argumentation is a relatively new formal theory of automated reason-
ing [10]. The goal is to judge hypotheses in the light of the given uncertain and partial
knowledge. Hypotheses represent open questions about the unknown or future
world. The ingredients of probabilistic argumentation are a formal language LV
over a set of variables V and a fully speciﬁed probability distribution P(A) over a
subset of variables A  V. It turns out that the two classical approaches of auto-
mated reasoning, that is logical reasoning on one hand and probablistic reasoning
on the other hand, are nothing but opposite extreme cases of this unifying theory,
namely for A = ; and A = V, respectively. And in fact, the concepts of provability
in logic and probability in probability theory are replaced by a more general concept
of probability of provability (see Section 3.2). In this paper, we will only consider the
simplest case of a possible formal language, namely the language of propositional
logic.
From a qualitative point of view, the problem is to derive arguments in favor and
counter-arguments against the hypothesis h of interest. An argument is a defeasible
proof built on uncertain assumptions. In other words, arguments are combinations
of true or false assumptions that permit to infer logically the truth of the hypothesis
h from the given knowledge base. Every argument provides thus a suﬃcient reason
that proves the hypothesis in the light of the available knowledge. And it ﬁnally con-
tributes to the possibility of believing or accepting the hypothesis. In other words,
arguments support and counter-arguments defeat the hypothesis h. Notice that coun-
ter-arguments can be regarded as arguments in favor of the negated hypothesis h
and vice versa.
A quantitative judgement of the situation is obtained by considering the probabil-
ities that the arguments and counter-arguments are valid. The credibility of a
hypothesis is measured by the total probabilities that it is supported or defeated
by arguments. Conﬂicts are handled through conditioning. The resulting sub-addi-
tive degree of support and super-additive degree of possibility are probabilities of prov-
ability and correspond to belief and plausibility, respectively, in the Dempster–Shafer
theory of evidence [19,21]. This connection will be further commented in Section 3.2.
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propositional language, consider two disjoint sets A and P of propositions. The ele-
ments of A are called assumptions and represent uncertain events, unknown circum-
stances, or possible states or outcomes. LA[P denotes the propositional language
over the total set V = A [ P of available propositions. The given uncertain knowledge
base is then encoded by a set of sentences R 2LA[P . This set is conjunctively inter-
preted. If all sentences of R are clauses, then it is possible to interpret R as a conjunc-
tive normal form n1^    ^nr.
3.1. Arguments, counter-arguments, conﬂicts
Consider the case where another propositional sentence h 2LA[P represents a
hypothesis about some of the propositions in A[P. What can be inferred from R
about the possible truth of h with respect to the given set of uncertain assumptions?
Possibly, if some of the assumptions are set to true and others to false, then h may be
a logical consequence of R.
More formally, ifTA denotes the set of all consistent conjunctions of non-repeat-
ing literals over A, then such a term a 2TA is an argument for h, if and only if
fag [ R  h: ð1Þ
Similarly, if {a} [ R  h, then a is a counter-argument against h. As stated
above, counter-arguments are arguments for h. An argument a for h is called min-
imal, if there is no shorter argument a 0a for h which subsumes a. The sets of all min-
imal arguments and minimal counter-argument with respect to h and R are denoted
by Args(h, R) and Args(h, R), respectively. Note that every a 2 Args(h, R) increases
the support for h, whereas every a 2 Args(h, R) decreases the possibility of h.
If a term a 2TA is both argument and counter-argument of h, then it is called
conﬂict. Conﬂicts are inconsistent with the knowledge base R. They represent impos-
sible states of the world which have be excluded. Note that conﬂicts are arguments
for ?. The set of all minimal conﬂicts is denoted by Args(?, R).
As an example, consider two sets of propositions A = {a1, a2, a3} and P = {X, Y}
and a knowledge base R given as a set
R ¼ fa1 ! X ;:a2 ! Y ; a3 ^ Y ! X ; a2 ! :Xg
of material implications. If X is the hypothesis of interest, then there are two minimal
arguments for X, one minimal counter-argument against X, and one minimal
conﬂict:
ArgsðX ;RÞ ¼ fa1;:a2 ^ a3g;
Argsð:X ;RÞ ¼ fa2g;
Argsð?;RÞ ¼ fa1 ^ a2g:
Computing the sets Args(h, R), Args(h, R), and Args(?, R) is the main computa-
tional problem of probabilistic argumentation [10]. Eﬃcient approximation algo-
rithms are obtained by focussing the search on the most relevant arguments [7]. It
is also possible to deﬁne convenient anytime algorithms which, upon interruption,
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monotonically when more computational resources are available. The method is
based on cost functions and returns lower and upper bounds. In Section 4.3, we will
present a simple special purpose algorithm designed for the speciﬁc problem ad-
dressed in this paper.3.2. Degrees of support and possibility
In order to judge h quantitatively, let all assumptions a 2 A be linked to corre-
sponding prior probabilities pa = P(a). We suppose them to be mutually independent.
By doing so, we get a fully speciﬁed joint probability distribution P(A) over the space
{0, 1}jAj of all possible conﬁgurations of true and false assumptions. Notice that,
from a conceptual point of view, any other way of specifying the joint distribution
P(A), for example with the aid of a Bayesian network or by an explicit list of values,
would be ﬁne too. This means that the speciﬁcation of arbitrary dependencies be-
tween the elements of A is possible. For example, the case of two perfectly correlated
assumptions a1, a2 2 A means that P(x) = 0 for all conﬁgurations x 2 {0, 1}jAj for
which a1 is true and a2 is false, or vice versa.
In the case of a given set of independent probabilities pa, the probability of a term
a 2TA is determined by
P ðaÞ ¼
Y
fpa : a 2 ag 
Y
f1 pa : :a 2 ag: ð2Þ
If T TA is an arbitrary set of terms, then P(T) denotes the overall probability of
all terms included in T. It corresponds to the probability that at least one term of T is
true. Note that any such set T = {a1, . . . , an} can be interpreted as a disjunctive nor-
mal form a1 _    _ an (DNF for short). The problem of computing P(T) is thus
equivalent to the general problem of computing probabilities of DNFs, for which
the so-called inclusion–exclusion formula provides a mathematically sound but very
ineﬃcient solution. More sophisticated methods have been developed in the domains
of reliability theory (under the name of sum-of-disjoint-products algorithms, e.g. see
[12]) and knowledge compilation [5]. For further information on this we refer to
the corresponding literature, in particular to Darwiches d-DNNF compiler [4],
which we consider the state-of-the-art in the ﬁeld.
Consider now the conditional probability that at least one argument for h is true
under the condition that none of the conﬂicts of R is true. This is a quantitative
measure of how much h is supported by arguments in the light of the given knowl-
edge. It depends on the two sets Args(h, R) and Args(?, R). If the set Args(?, R) is
considered as DNF, then Args(?, R) represents the condition that conﬂicts are
impossible. This allows us to deﬁne degree of support of h as
dspðh;RÞ ¼ PðArgsðh;RÞ j :Argsð?;RÞÞ
¼ PðArgsðh;RÞÞ  P ðArgsð?;RÞÞ
1 P ðArgsð?;RÞÞ : ð3Þ
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support are probabilities of provability [16,20]. They form a non-monotone and non-
additive measure that allows a proper distinction between uncertainty and ignorance.
Note that this concept is equivalent to the notion of (normalized) belief in the Demp-
ster–Shafer theory of evidence [19,21]. In other words, if all propositional sentences
in the knowledge base R as well as all prior probabilities pa are transformed into cor-
responding Dempster–Shafer mass functions over local domains (see [11] for details
on this), and these are all combined by Dempsters rule, then the resulting joint belief
function Bel(H) is identical to dsp(h) as deﬁned above.
A second way of judging the hypothesis h is to look at the conditional probability
that no counter-argument is true under the condition that none of the conﬂicts of R
is true. This is a quantitative measure of how possible h is in the light of the given
knowledge. Thus, degree of possibility of h is deﬁned as
dpsðh;RÞ ¼ P ð:Argsð:h;RÞ j :Argsð?;RÞÞ ¼ 1 dspð:h;RÞ: ð4Þ
Degree of possibility is equivalent to the notion of plausibility in the Dempster–
Shafer theory. Note that dsp(h, R) 6 dps(h, R) for all h 2LA[P and R LA[P . In
general, it is possible to interpret dps(h, R)  dsp(h, R) as the degree of ignorance in-
volved in the judgment of h with respect to R. The particular case of dsp(h, R) = 0
and dps(h, R) = 1 represents total ignorance over h. On the other hand,
dsp(h, R) = dps(h, R) means that we have a case of classical probabilistic reasoning.
Consider the example at the end of the previous subsection and suppose that
pa1 ¼ 0:2, pa2 ¼ 0:4, and pa3 ¼ 0:1 are the probabilities of the assumptions. The prob-
abilities of the DNFs formed by the respective sets of arguments, counter-arguments,
and conﬂicts are then as follows:
P ðArgsðX ;RÞÞ ¼ Pða1 _ :a2 ^ a3Þ ¼ Pða1 _ :a1 ^ :a2 ^ a3Þ
¼ 0:2þ 0:8  0:6  0:1 ¼ 0:248;
P ðArgsð:X ;RÞÞ ¼ P ða2Þ ¼ 0:4;
P ðArgsð?;RÞÞ ¼ P ða1 ^ a2Þ ¼ 0:2  0:4 ¼ 0:08:
Finally, according to (3) and (4), degree of support and degree of possibility are com-
puted as follows:dspðX ;RÞ ¼ 0:248 0:08
1 0:08 ¼ 0:183;
dspðX ;RÞ ¼ 1 0:4 0:08
1 0:08 ¼ 0:652:Although there is only a weak support, the hypothesis X remains quite possible. This
is an example where gathering more information should precede any rash decision
for or against X.
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We will now see how to encode a web of trust as a probabilistic argumentation
system. Because trust can be seen as someones conﬁdence in someone elses reliabil-
ity, we denote the reliability of an introducer X by the proposition rel(X). Gradual
conﬁdence in X can then be quantiﬁed by the subjective prior probability P(rel(X))
of X being a reliable introducer. The special case where X is a fully trustworthy CA is
encoded by P(rel(X)) = 1. On the other hand, P(rel(X)) = 0 stands for a case in which
X deserves no trust at all.
In a similar way, we use the proposition Val(X) to represent the case where Xs
public key is valid. Note that there is usually no prior knowledge about how certain
Val(X) is. It is therefore not possible to specify corresponding prior probabilities.
If U ¼ fX 0;X 1; . . . ;Xng is the set of all users included in the key ring owned by
X0, then
A ¼ frelðX 0Þ; relðX 1Þ; . . . ; relðXnÞg; ð5Þ
P ¼ fValðX 0Þ; ValðX 1Þ; . . . ; ValðXnÞg; ð6Þ
are the two sets of propositions needed to build a corresponding probabilistic argu-
mentation system. Note that the probabilities P(rel(X1)) to P(rel(Xn)) are speciﬁed
by X0, whereas X0 is implicitly assumed to be fully reliable by default and
thus P(rel(X0)) = 1. Similarly, because X0s own public key is implicitly valid,
Val(X0) is true by default. In Section 4.4, we will discuss the case in which trust
is not directly speciﬁed by X0, but indirectly with the aid of so-called recommenda-
tions.
In order to formulate X 0s certiﬁcate graph as an assumption-based knowledge
base R, consider the set C of all certiﬁcates contained in X 0s key ring, except those
that are issued by unknown users. A single certiﬁcate c 2 C of the form Xi) Xj
translates then into the following propositional sentence:cðcÞ ¼ cðX i ) X jÞ ¼ relðX jÞ ^ ValðX jÞ ! ValðX iÞ: ð7Þ
The idea of this translation is to consider X is public key as valid whenever Xj is a
reliable introducer with a valid public key. Note that this corresponds to Rule (b)
in PGPs trust model. In Maurers model [13, Deﬁnition 3.2], it is equivalent to
the ﬁrst inference rule, except that here the certiﬁcate itself is not explicitly linked
to a corresponding proposition. The complete knowledge base R is then the follow-
ing set R of propositional sentences:R ¼ fValðX 0Þg [ fcðcÞ : c 2 Cg: ð8ÞThe certiﬁcate graph in Fig. 3, for example, includes a set U ¼ fA;B; . . . ;Rg of 18
users who have issued 24 certiﬁcates (6 certiﬁcates were issued by unknown users).
This leads to the following knowledge base R consisting of 26 sentences:
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ValðAÞ;
relðAÞ ^ ValðAÞ ! ValðBÞ; relðAÞ ^ ValðAÞ ! ValðCÞ;
relðAÞ ^ ValðAÞ ! ValðDÞ; relðAÞ ^ ValðAÞ ! ValðEÞ;
relðAÞ ^ ValðAÞ ! ValðF Þ; relðBÞ ^ ValðBÞ ! ValðGÞ;
relðCÞ ^ ValðCÞ ! ValðHÞ; relðCÞ ^ ValðCÞ ! ValðIÞ;
relðDÞ ^ ValðDÞ ! ValðIÞ; relðDÞ ^ ValðDÞ ! ValðJÞ;
relðEÞ ^ ValðEÞ ! ValðJÞ; relðF Þ ^ ValðF Þ ! ValðEÞ;
relðF Þ ^ ValðF Þ ! ValðKÞ; relðGÞ ^ ValðGÞ ! ValðLÞ;
relðGÞ ^ ValðGÞ ! ValðMÞ; relðHÞ ^ ValðHÞ ! ValðCÞ;
relðHÞ ^ ValðHÞ ! ValðMÞ; relðHÞ ^ ValðHÞ ! ValðNÞ;
relðIÞ ^ ValðIÞ ! ValðNÞ; relðIÞ ^ ValðIÞ ! ValðOÞ;
relðJÞ ^ ValðJÞ ! ValðP Þ; relðJÞ ^ ValðJÞ ! ValðKÞ;
relðKÞ ^ ValðKÞ ! ValðJÞ; relðKÞ ^ ValðKÞ ! ValðQÞ
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
:
This is the complete knowledge base on which the evaluation of the public keys
will be based. Note that such a knowledge base consists of Horn clauses only.
This will considerably reduce the complexity of corresponding computations (see
Section 4.3).
4.1. Qualitative evaluation
How can such a knowledge base be used to evaluate the validity of the involved
public keys? First of all, if it is Xis key to be rated, then Val(Xi) is the hypothesis of
interest. Every minimal argument a 2 Args(Val(Xi), R) corresponds then to a (mini-
mal) certiﬁcate chain from Xi to X0. Furthermore, because R contains only positive
literals, there will be no counter-arguments against Val(Xi). This implies
Argsð:ValðX iÞ;RÞ ¼ ;; ð9Þ
Argsð?;RÞ ¼ ; ð10Þ
for all X i 2 U. Finally, this means that the evaluation of the public keys and the cor-
responding computational problems are restricted to sets of minimal arguments
Args(Val(Xi), R) for some X i 2 U. Note that, because the proposition Val(X0) is
implicitly true and therefore a part of the knowledge base, we have
Args(Val(X0), R) = {>}, where > denotes the argument that always holds.
Consider the example from above and suppose we are interested in the public keys
of J and P. In both cases, there are three minimal arguments supporting the corre-
sponding hypotheses Val(J) and Val(P), respectively:
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relðAÞ ^ relðDÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðEÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðF Þ ^ relðKÞ
8><
>:
9>=
>;;
ArgsðValðP Þ;RÞ ¼
relðAÞ ^ relðDÞ ^ relðJÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðEÞ ^ relðJÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðF Þ ^ relðKÞ ^ relðJÞ
8><
>:
9>=
>;:
The ﬁrst minimal argument rel(A) ^ rel(D) ^ rel(J) for Val(P), for example, corre-
sponds to the certiﬁcate chain P) J) D) A. Non-minimal certiﬁcate chains such
as P) J) E) F) A correspond to non-minimal arguments and are thus not in-
cluded in the above sets. Note that every minimal argument for Val(P) is obtained
from a corresponding minimal argument for Val(J) by conjoining it with rel(J). This
will be the key observation for a procedure that computes the minimal arguments for
all public keys included in the key ring (see Section 4.3).
The following table shows the minimal arguments for all public keys. To get a
more compact representation of theses sets, we write A ^ B, for example, instead
of rel(A) ^ rel(B).Xi Args(Val(Xi), R) Xi Args(Val(Xi), R)A > J A ^ D, A ^ E, A ^ F ^ K
B A K A ^ D ^ J, A ^ E ^ J, A ^ F
C A L A ^ B ^ G
D A M A ^ B ^ G, A ^ C ^ H
E A N A ^ C ^ H, A ^ C ^ I, A ^ D ^I
F A O A ^ C ^ I, A ^ D ^ I
G A ^ B P A ^ D ^ J, A ^ E ^ J, A ^F ^ K ^ J
H A ^ C Q A ^ D ^ J ^ K, A ^ E ^ J ^ K, A ^ F ^ K
I A ^ C, A ^ D R –Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the concept of minimal
arguments and Maurers minimal subsets V  ViewX 0 in his model based on prob-
abilistic logic [13].
4.2. Quantitative evaluation
From (9) follows that dps(Val(Xi), R) = 1 for all users X i 2 U. This means that de-
gree of support is the only relevant quantity to rate the validity of Xis public key. It
corresponds to the probability that the introducers of at least one certiﬁcate chain
are all reliable. Note that (10) implies P(Args(?, R)) = 0. As a consequence, we get
dspðValðX iÞ; RÞ ¼ P ðArgsðValðX iÞ; RÞÞ ð11Þ
for all X i 2 U. Suppose now that A has speciﬁed the reliability of the introducers
B to R according to the following table (second row). By default, we have
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the table.Xi A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
P(rel(Xi)) 1 .5 .9 .1 .8 .6 .9 .4 .5 .8 .2 .5 0 .1 0 .3 .1 .6
dsp(Val(Xi), R) 1 1 1 1 1 1 .5 .9 .91 .842 .862 .45 .648 .635 . 465 .673 .172 0Of course, As own public key automatically receives maximal support. The keys
of B, C, D, E, and F receive maximal support because they are directly signed by A.
Rs public key receives no support at all, because no certiﬁcate has been issued for R
which leads to Args(Val(R), R) = ;. All other keys are rated with values between 0
and 1. For example, consider the case of Ps public key with a degree of support of
dspðValðP Þ;RÞ ¼ PðArgsðValðP Þ;RÞÞ ¼ 0:673:
This means that there is a good amount of support for Ps public key, but it may
not be suﬃcient to accept the key as a valid public key and use it to encrypt messages
or validate signatures. In practice, it is convenient to specify a threshold 0 6 b 6 1
for which Xis key is accepted if and only if b 6 dsp(Val(Xi), R). Maximal security
means then to work with b = 1, but in such a case, most keys will rejected. On the
other hand, all keys are accepted for b = 0.
4.3. Computing arguments
General algorithms to compute minimal arguments for hypotheses are well doc-
umented in the literature [7–10]. Here, we are interested in a special purpose algo-
rithm which allows to compute minimal arguments in the context of the particular
type of knowledge base obtained from a web of trust. Compared to the general case,
three properties of such a particular R make the computation considerably less
complex:
• all sentences of R are Horn clauses (material implication with positive literals
only),
• every sentence of R (except Val(X0)) contains exactly one assumption rel(Xi),
• only simple hypotheses Val(Xi) are of interest.
As we have already observed earlier, this means that there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between (minimal) arguments for Val(Xi) and (minimal) paths between Xi
and X0 in the certiﬁcate graph. In this particular situation, the problem of computing
arguments is therefore equivalent to computing paths in a directed graph. For this,
we may take any classical search algorithm such as depth-ﬁrst (backtracking) or
breadth-ﬁrst search and adapt it such that all solutions (instead of just one) are
found. Particular attention has to be paid to the problem of inﬁnite loops which
may be caused by the cycles of the certiﬁcate graph.
In the following, we present a recursive procedure that computes the set of min-
imal arguments for all users X i 2 U. This means that the algorithm computes all
minimal paths from all nodes Xi to X0. Let CðX iÞ  U denote the set of all users
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ple, we have C(A) = {B, C, D, E, F}, C(B) = {G}, C(C) = {H, I}, etc. The idea of the
algorithm is based on the observation made in Section 4.1: if a is a minimal argument
for Val(Xi), then rel(Xi) ^ a is a (possibly non-minimal) argument for all propositions
Val(Xj) with Xj 2 C(Xi).
According to this remark, the core of the algorithm is a recursive function
add_argument(a,X), which adds a new argument a to the current set of arguments
Args(X) for user X. Initially, these sets are all empty. Adding an argument means
checking for minimality: if there is an argument a 0 2 Args(X) with a 0  a, then a is
non-minimal and the recursion stops. Otherwise, a is added to Args(X) and all
non-minimal arguments a 0  a are deleted from Args(X). Finally, the function recur-
sively calls itself for all Y 2 C(X) and with the extended argument rel(X) ^ a.
[01] function add_argument(a, X)
[02] begin
[03] unless $a 0 2 Args(X):a 0  a then
[04] begin
[05] Args(X) {a} [ {a 0 2 Args(X) : a 0 + a};
[06] loop for Y 2 C(X) do add_argument(rel(X) ^ a, Y);
[07] end;
[08] end.
If X 0 2 U is the owner of the key ring, then the computation of the arguments is
initiated by calling the above function by add_argument(>, X0). The argument >
initially assigned to X0 is unconditionally true and reﬂects the fact that X0s own
public key is implicitly valid. Note that > ^ a and a are equivalent terms. Once
the recursion comes to an end, we obtain the complete sets of minimal arguments
Args(Xi) = Args(Val(Xi), R) for all users X i 2 U included in the key ring.
The procedure induced by the above recursive function is similar to a recursive
depth-ﬁrst backtracking search. As a consequence of this, it is possible that several
non-minimal arguments are found during the computation. They are temporarily
stored in the corresponding set Args(X), from which they are deleted when a shorter
argument is found. To avoid such non-minimal solutions, one can deﬁne a similar
procedure in the form of a corresponding breadth-ﬁrst search. The length of the
arguments determines then the order in which they are generated, and non-minimal
arguments are thus impossible. This means that the time complexity of such an algo-
rithm depends linearly on the total number
N ¼
X
X2U
jArgsðValðX Þ;RÞj ð12Þ
of all minimal arguments. With respect to the number n of all users, there may be
exponentially many such minimal arguments. But this is the worst case scenario
which seems to be atypical in practice. Note that if the complexity of the computa-
tion is problematical, it may still be possible to use the above method as an interrupt-
ible anytime algorithm [27]. The resulting conﬁdence values are then lower bounds
that are guaranteed to be on the ‘‘safe side’’.
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Normally, an introducer who issues a digital certiﬁcate conﬁrms the validity of the
corresponding public key. A certiﬁcate can thus be regarded as positive evidence
which broadens the basis for accepting a key. In this sense, evaluating a web of trust
is monotone, because adding new certiﬁcates increases the corresponding values
dsp(Val(Xi), R) monotonically.
In this subsection, we will discuss the case of an extended web of trust that con-
tains negative evidence in the form of key revocations. Intuitively, a key revocation is
a certiﬁcate the conﬁrms the falsity of a key. They can be important in at least two
diﬀerent situations:
• Suppose X is trying to verify Ys public key over a secure channel, but the veriﬁ-
cation fails. X concludes that the key does not belong to Y and revokes it.
• Suppose Xs public key will need to be removed from service. This may be because
the corresponding private key has been compromised or irretrievably lost. ‘‘Role
keys’’ provide good examples of innocently compromised keys. For example,
when a member of staﬀ leaves an institution, it is undesirable that they should still
be able to read mail sent to the oﬃcial institution address. In such a case, the insti-
tutions CA may revoke Xs public key.
Consider the web of trust depicted in Fig. 3 and suppose C has revoked Gs public
key and I has revoked Js public key. Formally, we write G; C and J; I. How
does this aﬀect the evaluation of the public keys?
Let R be the set of all key revocations included in the key ring. A single key rev-
ocation r 2 R of the form Xi; Xj can then be expressed by the following proposi-
tional sentence:
qðrÞ ¼ qðX i;X jÞ ¼ relðX jÞ ^ ValðX jÞ ! :ValðX iÞ: ð13Þ
The idea of this translation is analogue to (7): if Xjs public key is valid and if Xj is
a reliable revoker, then Xis public key is invalid. In the following, we will thus con-
sider the evaluation of public keys based on an extended knowledge base
R ¼ fValðX 0Þg [ fcðcÞ : c 2 Cg [ fqðrÞ : r 2 Rg: ð14Þ
First of all, note that R still consists of Horn clauses only. This means that we can
still expect simple computations. In fact, it is easy to see that every certiﬁcate chain
Y; Y1)    ) Yr) X0 corresponds to a counter-argument againstVal(Y) and vice
versa. Counter-arguments can therefore be derived from the setsArgs(Val(Xi), R). For
example, if we extend the graph of Fig. 3 with G; C and J; I, then we get
Argsð:ValðGÞ;RÞ ¼ frelðAÞ ^ relðCÞg;
Argsð:ValðJÞ;RÞ ¼ relðAÞ ^ relðCÞ ^ relðIÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðDÞ ^ relðIÞ
 
;
Argsð:ValðX iÞ;RÞ ¼ ; for allX i 6¼ G; J :
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means that the set of conﬂicts Args(?, R) is no longer empty. In general, if we have
non-empty sets Args(Val(Xi), R)5 ; and Args(Val(Xi), R)5 ; for some X i 2 U,
then minimal conﬂicts are constructed by conjoining the corresponding minimal
arguments and counter-arguments. For example, because rel(A) ^ rel(B) is an mini-
mal argument for and rel(A) ^ rel(C) a minimal counter-argument against Val(G), it
follows that
relðAÞ ^ relðBÞ ^ relðAÞ ^ relðCÞ  relðAÞ ^ relðBÞ ^ relðCÞ
is a conﬂict with respect to R. In fact, if we suppose that A, B, and C are all reliable (A
is totally reliable by default), then Bs certiﬁcate and Cs key revocation for G are in
conﬂict to each other, which is impossible. More conﬂicts are obtained from Is key
revocation for J. There are three minimal arguments and two minimal counter-argu-
ments for Val(J), from which we can construct six (possibly non-minimal) conﬂicts:
relðAÞ ^ relðCÞ ^ relðDÞ ^ relðIÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðDÞ ^ relðIÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðCÞ ^ relðEÞ ^ relðIÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðDÞ ^ relðEÞ ^ relðIÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðCÞ ^ relðF Þ ^ relðIÞ ^ relðKÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðDÞ ^ relðF Þ ^ relðIÞ ^ relðKÞ:
Together with the conﬂict rel(A) ^ rel(B) ^ rel(C) obtained for G and by dropping
non-minimal ones, four minimal conﬂicts remain:
Argsð?;RÞ ¼
relðAÞ ^ relðBÞ ^ relðCÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðDÞ ^ relðIÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðCÞ ^ relðEÞ ^ relðIÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðCÞ ^ relðF Þ ^ relðIÞ ^ relðKÞ
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
:
Of course, the presence of counter-arguments and conﬂicts has a great impact on
the quantitative evaluation of the public keys. In fact, every additional key revoca-
tion decreases the degree of support and also the degree of possibility of some
X i 2 U. Recall that the absence of key revocations implies dps(Val(Xi), R) = 1 for
all X i 2 U. If we reapply (3) and (4) for the current example and the same prior prob-
abilities P(rel(Xi)) as in Section 4.2, we get the following new values:Xi A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
P(rel(Xi)) 1 .5 .9 .1 .8 .6 .9 .4 .5 .8 .2 .5 0 .1 0 .3 .1 .6
dsp(Val(Xi), R) 1 1 1 1 1 1 .134 .733 .747 .755 .83 .12 .41 .353 .1 .604 .155 0
dps(Val(Xi), R) 1 1 1 1 1 1 .267 1 .896 .9 .991 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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values of G, J, and their dependents, but also of all other users except of those who
have a direct certiﬁcate from A (including the revokers C and I). This is due to the
fact that Cs key revocation for G, for example, negatively inﬂuences As initial trust
in C, because it is in conﬂict with the certiﬁcate chain G) B) A. As consequence,
we can also expect lower values for all users who depend on a certiﬁcate issued by C,
which is conﬁrmed by the values of the above table.
In the presence of key revocations, the decision between valid and invalid keys
is more complicated. It depends not just on dsp(V al(Xi), R), but also on
dps(Val(Xi), R). A simple approach is specify two thresholds b and b 0 with
0 6 b 0 < b 6 1. A key is accepted whenever b 6 dsp(Val(Xi), R) (as before), and it
is rejected for b 0P dps(Val(Xi), R). Otherwise, no deﬁnite decision is taken. For
b = 0.75 and b 0 = 0.5, for example, A would thus accept the keys of B, C, D, E, F,
J, and K, but reject the key of G. All other keys are considered as ‘‘unclassiﬁed’’ until
additional certiﬁcates or key revocations allow a better judgment.
4.5. Recommendations
Another possible extension of a web of trust is the inclusion of recommendations.
Because it is impossible to personally know all entities of a large network, it may be
diﬃcult to assign adequate trust values P(rel(X)) to all users X 2 U. In a classical
web of trust (one without recommendations), this problem is usually solved by
assigning minimal trust P(rel(X)) = 0 to all unknown users X. This implies that the
resulting conﬁdence values dsp(Val(X), R) are guaranteed to be pessimistic, that is
on the ‘‘safe side’’.
A more sophisticated possibility to judge the trustworthiness of unkown users is
to consider so-called explicit recommendations from other users. Such recommenda-
tions can be thought as signed statements about the trustworthiness of other users
and are similar to certiﬁcates. A distributed public-key management that includes ex-
plicit recommendations has ﬁrst been introduced in [25,1]. A more complete view on
this is given in [13]. Because recommendations are often sensitive information to be
treated conﬁdentially, which demands additional cryptographical protocols, they
have not yet been used in systems such as PGP.
The model introduced by Maurer in [13] allows several levels of recommendation.
A recommendation of the ﬁrst level is for someone to be a trustworthy issuer of cer-
tiﬁcates. A recommendation of the second level is for someone to be trustworthy in
giving recommendations of the ﬁrst level, and so on. In general, a recommendation
of level i is for someone to be trustworthy in giving recommendations of level i  1.
In a certain sense, certiﬁcates can be regarded as recommendations of level 0.
In principle, it is possible to distinguish individual trust values P(reli(X)) for all
possible levels i = 1, 2, . . . , but here we will only consider one value P(rel(X)) that
is applicable to all levels. At ﬁrst sight, this is similar to Maurers assumption that
trust of level i implies trust of all levels j < i, but it means also, that only one level
of recommendations will be considered. Note that this is not a conceptual restriction,
but it will help to keep the discussion reasonably simple.
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but consider the case in which H has been recommended by G and I. Formally, we
write H[ G and H [ I. How does this determine the trustworthiness of H from
the point of view of A? LetM be the set of all available recommendations. A single
recommendation m 2M of the form Xi[ Xj can then be translated into the follow-
ing propositional sentence:
lðmÞ ¼ lðX i , X jÞ ¼ relðX jÞ ^ ValðX jÞ ! relðX iÞ: ð15Þ
Essentially, this is equivalent to the second inference rule in Maurers model [13,
Deﬁnition 3.2], except that here the recommendation itself is not explicitly linked to
a corresponding proposition. The idea of this translation is the following: if Xj is con-
sidered to be trustworthy (reliable in giving recommendations and issuing certiﬁ-
cates), and if Xjs public key is valid, then Xi is also considered to be trustworthy.
In the following, we will thus consider the evaluation of public keys based on an ex-
tended knowledge base
R ¼ fValðX 0Þg [ fcðcÞ : c 2 Cg [ fqðrÞ : r 2 Rg [ flðrÞ : r 2Mg:
First of all, note that the new sentences l(m) are also Horn clauses. As a conse-
quence, we can still expect the necessary computations to be simple. In fact, given Gs
and Is recommendations for H, if we consider the hypothesis rel(H) with respect to
user H, then it is easy to see that rel(H) is true whenever either Val(G) together with
rel(G) or Val(I) together with rel(I) is true. This means that the set of minimal argu-
ments for rel(H) can be derived from the sets Args(rel(G), R) and Args(rel(I), R). The
leads then to
ArgsðrelðHÞ;RÞ ¼
relðAÞ ^ relðBÞ ^ relðGÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðCÞ ^ relðIÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðDÞ ^ relðIÞ
8><
>:
9>=
>;;
and the corresponding numerical value dsp(rel(H), R) measures the trustworthiness
of user H.
Now, let the goal be to evaluate the validity of Ns public key. Because one of the
three original minimal arguments for Val(N) depends on rel(H) (see Section 4.1), we
can determine the new set Args(Val(N), R) by substituting rel(H) with the three ele-
ments of Args(rel(H), R). After dropping non-minimal arguments, this leads to
ArgsðValðNÞ;RÞ ¼
relðAÞ ^ relðBÞ ^ relðCÞ ^ relðGÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðCÞ ^ relðIÞ;
relðAÞ ^ relðDÞ ^ relðIÞ
8><
>:
9>=
>;;
from which the new value for dsp(Val(N), R) can be derived. By doing so, note that
rel(H) must be considered as an element of the set P instead of the set A, which
means that user A does not need to specify a prior probability P(rel(H)). This remark
applies to all users whose trustworthiness depends on recommendations from others.
The problem of computing minimal arguments in an extended web of trust with
recommendations can be solved as illustrated above. We do not give an explicit algo-
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4.3, that is executed subsequent to the initial call of add_argument(>, X0).5. Conclusion
This paper investigates trust evaluation in public-key infrastructures based on
probabilistic argumentation. It is remarkable how straightforwardly certiﬁcate
graphs, key revocations, and recommendations are expressible as probabilistic argu-
mentations systems. Degree of support seems then to be an appropriate quantity to
rate the validity of public keys. We propose the results of this paper to be taken as
the basis for a more sophisticated trust model in cryptographic applications like PGP.
Future work will focus on how to include dependencies between the users. Due to
the clear conﬂict management of probabilistic argumentation and the expressive
power of the underlying logical language, we already see a number of possible ways
to extend the basic model accordingly. Right now, these are preliminary results that
need to be worked out.Acknowledgment
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